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THE IDEA OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE UNITED STATES— The JHU 5/10/2004 
 
1_ The French law of 1839 and the idea of photography. 
 
 In 1839, France supposedly "gave photography to the world". What happened was that 
the French Parliament passed a bill by which the first photographic process, the 
daguerreotype, was made public in return for a pension for its inventors, Daguerre and 
Niépce. This exceptional procedure dispensed with the usual patent and made the process 
public knowledge. It was to boost the spread of the daguerreotype around the world. Since it 
was viewed by some as a mere protection measure, strong justification was needed. This was 
provided by François Arago, secretary of the Académie des sciences and influential leader of 
the left wing in the Chamber of Deputies. The most powerful argument was that Daguerre's 
process was too simple to be eligible for a patent — that it was in fact more of the nature of an 
idea than of an industry. As the Interior Minister put it, no doubt at Arago’s prompting : 
[QUOTE 1] 
 
Unfortunately for the authors of this beautiful discovery, it is impossible for them to make it 
an object of industry, and to repay themselves for the sacrifices exacted from them by so many 
fruitless trials. Their invention does not admit of being secured by a patent. As soon as it 
becomes known, anyone can make use of it [dès qu'elle sera connue, chacun pourra s'en 
servir]. The clumsiest will make drawings as exactly as a trained artist. It is therefore 
necessary that this process belong to everyone, or that it remain unknown.1 
 
This argumentation would soon be disproved. Daguerre took out a patent in England. Even in 
the U.S., where the daguerreotype excited the greatest enthusiasm, it was only a matter of 
months before it became the business of professionals, and the subject of many secondary 
patents. We may therefore describe the argument as ideological; but it was nonetheless 
embodied in a law, and this law gave credence to an idea of photography that was to be of 
lasting consequence. Considering the strength of this idea, its durability and its productivity, I 
prefer to regard it, rather than as ideology in the usual sense, as a "discursive formation" in 
Michel Foucault's sense, i.e. a mode of regulation of social practices by discourse. 
 
                                                
1. T. DUCHATEL, in DAGUERRE, Historique et description des procédés du Daguerréotype et du Diorama 
(1839, repr. 1982), 2. 
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Let me spell out this idea a little bit. In 1839, the prevalent notion was not that photography 
would democratize visual information. Louis-Philippe's Minister of police linked the 
invention of photography to another prospect, even more utopian, if not incongruous: that of a 
democracy of picture-makers. "Chacun pourra s'en servir." Because photography was so 
simple, so artless, it was bound to become universal. It is this cogent link between 
photography and democracy, or between the aspiration to photography and the aspiration to 
democracy, that I call "the idea of photography" in my book, and which I dub with a slogan, 
"art sans art, art pour tous"—"art without art, art for all". 
 
The legal argument, to be sure, gained its strength from the novel kind of images that this 
invention produced: wonderfully faithful pictures, exact to the microscopic detail. But this 
faith in the absolute "realism" of photographic images, hard for us to admit today, should not 
obscure the radicality of the argument. More than it was a thesis on representation, the 
Minister's argument embodied a conception of photography as practice and situated its 
significance in the political realm: indeed it depicted this new practice of picture-making as 
egalitarian by principle. The law as a whole indicated that although the novelty of 
photography materialized itself in the dizzying exactitude of its images, it was the 
"mechanical" or "natural" mode of production of these images that most concretely heralded a 
"revolution", as many a commentator would put it. A revolution, then, not only because more 
people than ever before would be able to get portraits and pictures of the world. A revolution, 
insofar as photography seemed to disqualify the institution of art and its hierarchies of value 
and labor, by giving "anyone" and even "the clumsiest" the power to "make drawings" that 
until then had been reserved for the very few. A revolution that, fifty years after 1789, 
trumpeted the people's right not only to get pictures, but to make them. 
 
What I want to do today is to explore the career of this revolutionary idea in the United States, 
or at least a few moments in that career. Indeed, the idea of photography, as I have described 
it, has been more fervently and widely adopted in the U.S. than anywhere else. This may seem 
obvious, and even trite: if the democratic vocation of photography is to culminate in Kodak 
ads, what's the point? Yet I think there is a point. Photography's link to democracy, although 
born in France, remained dormant there (and in Europe) after 1839, or was regarded, at best, 
condescendingly. In the U.S., this link was explicitly claimed, and often brilliantly expressed 
by intellectuals (who conversely brought less passion than their European counterparts to the 
debate on the nature of photographic images). More generally, as I will suggest, the 
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development of this idea in the U.S. went beyond the scope of its initial formulation, and of 
what we normally understand by "idea". I will argue that in the U.S., the idea of photography 
has translated into a full-fledged political tradition, because photography has been adopted as 
topic of general interest, a public affair or res publica. 
 
2_ Emerson’s "republican style of painting" 
 
 It has often been noted that the advent of the daguerreotype in the U.S. elicited as 
strong a response from American intellectuals as it did among the population at large. 
Examples of this enthusiastic response range from Samuel Morse describing the 
daguerreotype image as "Rembrandt perfected" to Edgar Allan Poe hailing the invention as 
"the most extraordinary triumph of modern science". Both Morse and Poe kept abreast of the 
technical developments that led, before the year 1840 was over, to the successful application 
of the daguerreotype to portraiture. This application, as is also well-known, soon became the 
nearly exclusive use of the new process in the U.S., and fed the growth of a business that was 
to be exceptionally strong and durable. Sometimes derided abroad, the American infatuation 
with the daguerreotype portrait and the ingenuity of its leading practitioners earned the U.S. 
several medals at the Crystal Palace World Fair in 1851. Horace Greeley exclaimed, "in 
daguerreotype we beat the world". In the same year, the spiritual and disciplinary exercise of 
reading the soul in the face, often associated with the American portrait tradition, became a 
topic for Hawthorne's romance, The House of the Seven Gables. This was the first significant 
work of fiction in the world to give a leading role to a photographer— in this case, a 
daguerreotypist whose deeply significant plates assisted in unmasking the evil figure of Judge 
Pyncheon. In 1854, the first edition of Leaves of Grass was adorned on its frontispiece with 
an uncaptioned portrait of its author, engraved from a daguerreotype by Mathew Brady, as if 
to signify that the Poet himself was henceforth defined by his public image. Brady, by this 
stage, was the highly successful owner of a luxurious salon on Broadway, where he offered 
portraits of "illustrious Americans" to the gaze of customers in search of imitable models. As 
Richard Rudisill, Alan Trachtenberg, and others have shown, the "mirror image" of the 
daguerreotype helped in the construction of a national identity, or perhaps, given the anxious 
mood of the 1850s, in the salvaging of a confident self-image.  
 
American writers, then, were not the last to participate in this cult, albeit with ironic 
undertones. Hawthorne's and Whitman's involvements with photography, in particular, have 
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raised a lot of commentary. Less attention has been given, however, to the thoughts on this 
subject of their common intellectual hero, Ralph Waldo Emerson. Stanley Cavell has argued 
that Emerson's call, in "The American Scholar", for a literature that would embrace "the 
common… the familiar, the low", amounted to a striking prefiguration of "the obsessions of 
photography"2  But Emerson's esthetics is highly intellectual; and in the current wave of 
political reinterpretation of the Emersonian corpus, esthetics as a whole has taken a back seat. 
More resonant with current critical trends is the interpretation of "The American Scholar" 
offered by Stephen J. Hartnett in a recent book on "Cultural Fictions in Antebellum America". 
Hartnett claims, quite convincingly, that Emerson was concerned with the survival of "the 
individual character [...] amid the mass-produced culture of modernity" — with the modern 
questions of "how the self is constructed, how the self and society interact […] how the 
practices of the market threaten the promises of democracy". Yet, according to Hartnett, 
Emerson never addressed these questions "in a form other than the high-minded political 
sermon", unlike Whitman. I agree that Emerson priviledged the political, but I would like to 
show that, as far as the daguerreotype was concerned, Emerson's questions, if perhaps "high-
minded", were far from timid. 
 
These questions, it must be granted, were mostly private. Quite strikingly, Emerson's intense 
interest in the daguerreotype expressed itself almost exclusively in his journals. With one or 
two exceptions, those passages dealing with the daguerreotype that he culled for his essays or 
lectures were rephrased so as to eliminate explicit references to it. The daguerreotype was 
clearly for him a sensitive subject, because it questioned the eminently significant border 
between "society" and "the self", or between the public and the private. Thus it was in the 
wake of one of his first visits to a daguerrian studio, in Boston in October, 1841, to have his 
own portrait taken, that Emerson confided to his journal the first entries on the subject, which 
are also the most extended and, to me, the most audacious. Bitterly disappointed by the 
portrait, as he was to be with almost every subsequent attempt, he described the experience as, 
quite literally, a small death: [QUOTE 2.A] 
 
Were you ever Daguerrotyped, O immortal man ? And did you look with all vigor at the lens 
of the camera or rather by the direction of the operator at the brass peg a little below it to give 
the picture the full benefit of your expanded & flashing eye ? and in your zeal not to blur the 
image, did you keep every finger in its place with such energy that your hands became 
                                                
2 EMERSON, "The American Scholar", Selected Essays, Penguin Classics, p. 102. S. CAVELL, XXX 
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clenched as for fight or despair, & in your resolution to keep your face still, did you feel every 
muscle becoming every moment more rigid : the brows contracted into a Tartarean frown, and 
the eyes fixed as (only) they are in /a/ fit(s), in madness, or in death ; and when at last you are 
relieved of your dismal duties, did you find the curtain drawn perfectly, and the coat perfectly, 
& the hands true, clenched for combat, and the shape of the face & head ? but unhappily the 
total expression (had) escaped from the face and you held the portrait of a mask instead of a 
man. Could you not by grasping it very tight hold the stream of a river or of a small brook & 
prevent it from flowing 3?  
 
Crushing as it did the writer's narcissistic persona, this experience became, as it was repeated, 
something of a wound (as is shown by his correspondence with Thomas Carlyle). Yet not 
only was it never allowed to emerge in the public writings, but in the secret of the journals 
Emerson turned the private mishap into a clearly positive, and clearly political, interpretation 
of the daguerreotype. In the same month of October, 1841, we read in his journals the 
following two remarkable entries, which are rarely commented on: [QUOTES 2.B and 2.C] 
 
The Daguerrotype is good for its authenticity. No man quarrels with his shadow, nor will he 
with his miniature when the sun was the painter. Here is no interference, and the distortions 
are not the blunders of an artist, but only those of motion, imperfect light, and the like4.  
 
 ‘Tis certain that the Daguerrotype is the true Republican style of painting. The Artist stands 
aside & lets you paint yourself. If you make an ill head, not he but yourself are responsible and 
so people who go Daguerrotyping have a pretty solemn time. They come home confessing & 
lamenting their sins. A Daguerreotype Institute is as good as a national Fast5.  
 
One reason why such texts often go unnoticed is that they seem to epitomize what is 
commonly described as the naive belief of the 19th century in "sun painting", i.e. in the 
absolute and natural truthfulness of the photographic image. The critique of this "positivist 
faith" has occupied so many commentators since the 1950s that it has become almost 
impossible, today, to treat it as anything but a myth. Thus, Carol Schloss castigates the 
"almost uniform failure" of 19th-century "photographers and laymen alike", "to regard the 
                                                
3(Oct. 24, 1841, The Journals, Vol. VIII, p. 115-116) 
4(october 1841, Joel Porte, Emerson in his Journals, HUP 1982, p. 264) 
5(october-november 1841, Porte, p. 271). 
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photographer as an active participant, and shaper of, procedures and events"6. But what, I 
would ask, if this "failure" were a conscious adhesion to an attractive idea? Another 
"problem" with these texts is the religious interpretation of the session at the daguerreotypist 
(confession, sins, fasting). Emerson seems to share in the whole popular association of 
photography with rituals of revelation, incrimination and conviction. The American version of 
the 19th century's naive faith in sun-painting would appear indeed "high-minded", and 
seriously retrograde, trapped in a "puritan" heritage or in its modern, utilitarianist, avatars. But 
what if Emerson were saying exactly the opposite? 
 
I would like to examine the "republican" message of the daguerreotype, as construed by 
Emerson. "Republican" is an interesting adjective, especially as contrasted to "democratic". 
Emerson nowhere talks of "democracy" in connection with photography. In his many journal 
entries on the daguerreotype he never alludes to the spread of pictures through society, let 
alone to the utopia of a nation of photographers. (Lady Elizabeth Eastlake, in 1857, would 
describe the photographic brotherhood as a "kind of republic"—not Emerson.) He did not 
participate in the Daguerreian cult that, even after Daguerre's death in 1851, kept alive his 
memory as a "brother" and a generous "giver" of photography. (Though he did list Daguerre 
among the names of great inventors whose arts, because they were "for all", benefitted "the 
morals of society" and kept "aristocracy" at bay7.) Generally speaking, Emerson's whig 
aversion to mass rituals and to the ultra-egalitarianism of the Jacksonian era made him 
reluctant to embrace any popular program of cultural democracy.  
 
In what sense, then, is the daguerreotype "the true Republican style of painting"? The word 
clearly does not aim at a strictly political (or Lockean) sense of "republic" as a form of 
government based on the principles of liberty and equality and organized by the rule of law: 
perhaps all have equal rights to a self-image, but this is not the main point. "Republican", 
here, refers rather to the broader doctrine of republicanism as civic virtue. This doctrine, 
based on Christian values of modesty and sobriety, permeated the political culture and the 
institutions of the early Republic. In the 1830s, it imbued reform campaigns for temperance, 
the rights of women, or the abolition of slavery. The remarkable equivalence between a 
"daguerreotype institute" (perhaps inspired by the ambitious venture of the Bostonian 
                                                
6 Carol SHLOSS, In Visible Light, Photography and the American Writer: 1840-1940, New York, Oxford UP, 
1987, p. 32. 
7 Emerson, Journals vol. X, 1847, p. 173-174. 
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daguerreotypist John Plumbe) and a "national Fast" (reminiscent of civic festivals that were 
popular in the 1830s) points at this moral-social interpretation of republicanism. In this 
interpretation, the daguerreotype portrait ritual becomes an instrument of reform, a modern 
transposition of the cleansing of the soul that, for Emerson, could no longer be achieved in 
prayer and confession. In the context of Emerson's resolutely lay view of society (and of his 
moral perfectionism), the meaning of this transposition should not be mistaken: far from 
simply translating the novelty of photography in an outdated "religious" lexicon, the fiction of 
the "daguerreotype institute" is the figure of a successful substitution of modern civic virtue 
for the outdated religious rituals. 
 
But again, what is it about the daguerreotype that promotes civic virtue ? This is where the 
texts become quite fascinating, by their forceful abstraction of photography as "republican 
painting", i.e. as a political protocol that echoes and enriches the French idea of photography. 
As we know, the republicanism of the Founding Fathers, especially John Adams, associated 
painting and painters with the luxury and corruption of European aristocracies. The phrase 
"the republican style of painting" is almost oxymoronic in this context: it defines a form of 
painting where the artist achieves perfect modesty by virtually disappearing. He "stands aside 
and lets you paint yourself", as if he were only a witness for a transaction that pits the sitter in 
front of the machine — a representation, as it were, that no longer needs the medium of 
representation. In cartoons and studio views of the period, the technical protocol of 
photography was depicted as a triangle —sitter, photographer and camera— with no obvious 
center and no single direction of circulation, which replaced the face-to-face encounter of the 
artist and his subject. Note the verb form Emerson uses: "people who go daguerrotyping have 
a pretty solemn time". The verb conflates the action of the operator and the experience of the 
sitter in one medial or median function. And in Emerson's daguerreotype institute, the artist, 
by standing aside, is relieved from all responsibility —as well as from all merit— over the 
picture : "the distortions are not the blunders of an artist, but only those of motion, imperfect 
light, and the like", says the first passage, while the second adds more pointedly, "If you make 
an ill head, not he but yourself are responsible". As if a daguerreotype portrait were always a 
self-portrait, only assisted by the camera and validated, so to speak, by the artist's presence. 
(See this example of a studio view where the sitter and the photographer look exactly alike.) 
Likewise, the "distortions" must be ascribed to the sitter—and not to the artistic concerns and 
limitations of a painter. Thus, the daguerreotype’s truth is defined primarily not as adequation 
but as agreement ("no man quarrels with his shadow") between “self” and “society” (or 
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between an image and society’s norms); more radically, between “self” and “self”, i.e. 
between the individual's self-image and the image it naturally and freely projects to the 
camera. The daguerreotype is the “republican style of painting”, then, in at least two senses: 
first, because, there being no “interference” of an artist, everyone is now responsible for 
his/her (public) image; second, because, having now to bear "the burden of representation", in 
John Tagg's phrase, he/she is liable for its defects, and bound to reform him-/ herself 
accordingly. Emerson's "daguerreotype institute" is the fictional home of a protocol that 
emulates the republican constitution in prescribing that the subject (of painting) become the 
citizen (of an image society), and in giving this citizen a chance to conform his/her self-image 
to a civic ideal.  
 
A close approximation of this fiction in historical reality was Mathew Brady’s Broadway 
studio, more a gallery than a studio really, where customers who went "daguerrotyping" had 
the opportunity to admire and to emulate the portraits of the “illustrious Americans” hanging 
on the walls. Brady's gallery also embodied, of course, the risks of conformity and 
commercialization—something like the destruction of “the self” by “the many”, or, as 
Kierkegaard put it, the risk that, once “everyone will be able to have their portrait taken”, 
people would "all look exactly the same—so that we shall only need one portrait."8 But 
Emerson did not echo this fear. Instead he suggested the opposite possibility that the 
daguerreotype portrait might express or restore the individuality of the individual, and that the 
daguerreotype gallery might form the truest image of the nation, or of the times. In the same 
fall of 1841, another passage in his journal gives a striking formulation of photography’s 
potential function as public revelator, or as a metaphor for the revelation that Emerson himself 
takes on in his speeches of the period. This passage is transcribed, in a somewhat softened 
version, in the first of the Lectures on the Times (given in December, 1841), where it is one of 
the rare occurrences of the daguerreotype in Emerson's public writings. I am quoting from the 
Journal: [QUOTE 3.A] 
 
And why not draw for these times a portrait gallery ?… A camera ! A camera ! cries the 
century, that is the only toy. Come let us paint the agitator and the dilettante and the member 
of Congress and the college professor, the Unitarian minister, the editor of the newspaper, the 
fair contemplative girl, the aspirant for fashion & opportunities, the woman of the world who 
has tried & knows better—let us examine how well she knows. Good fun it would be for a 
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master who with delicate finger in the most decisive yet in the most parliamentary & 
unquestionable manner should indicate all the lions by traits not to be mistaken yet so that 
none should dare wag his finger whilst the shadow of each well known form flitted for a 
moment across the wall. So should we have at last if it were done well a series of sketches 
which would report to the next ages the color & quality of ours.9 
 
And here I switch to the version in the public lecture: [QUOTE 3.B] 
 
And why not draw for these times a portrait gallery ? Let us paint the painters. Whilst the 
Daguerreotype professor, with camera-obscura and silver plate, begins now to traverse the 
land, let us set up our Camera also, and let the sun paint the people. Let us paint the agitator, 
and the man of the old school, and the member of Congress, and the college-professor, the 
formidable editor, the priest, and reformer, the contemplative girl, and the fair aspirant for 
fashion & opportunities, the woman of the world who has tried and knows—let us examine 
how well she knows. Good office it were with delicate finger in the most decisive, yet in the 
most parliamentary and unquestionable manner, to indicate the indicators, to indicate those 
who most accurately represent every good and evil tendency of the general mind, in the just 
order which they take on this canvass of Time; so that all witnesses should recognise a 
spiritual law, as each well known form flitted for a moment across the wall. So should we 
have, if it were rightly done, a series of sketches which would report to the next ages the color 
and quality of ours..10 
 
The indication which the camera serves as a model for is clearly political, and its aim seems 
to be not only memorialization but unmasking. The prime targets for Emerson’s camera are 
political figures (the agitator, the member of Congress, the reformer) and more generally 
figures of authority and social influence (the college professor, the editor, the priest, the 
fashionable woman, the “indicators”). Those figures, precisely the ones that Brady celebrated 
in his Gallery of Illustrious Americans , are to be “reported” to the “next age”; and here we 
may be reminded also of Mathew Brady’s ambition to become a “historian with a camera”. 
But whereas Brady clearly intended to celebrate his illustrious Americans, Emerson’s report 
implicitly describes its objects as so many masks born out of modern culture, which the 
rhetorical camera does not just record but “indicates”, exposes, or even indicts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
8 Quoted by Susan SONTAG, On Photography, p. 207. 
9 Oct 21, 1841, Porte, p. 268-269. 
10 “ Lectures on the Times ”, “ Introductory Lecture ”, read Dec. 2, 1841, Emerson, Collected Works, t. 1, p. 170. 
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As early as 1841, then, Emerson formulated photography as an organizing metaphor for the 
elaboration and revision of representation in a democratic society, thus programming —in 
purely rhetorical terms, to be sure— the future political uses of photography, or at least some 
of them. In the same month of December, 1841, he noted in his journal that "the French police 
daguerreotype all their culprits"11, showing an awareness and perhaps some excitement at the 
idea that photography's certifying powers could be enlisted by apparatuses of justice, police, 
medicine, and anthropology, as they would be in many cases in the U.S. after 1850. In the 
lecture version of this text, however, he placed his rhetorical camera under the aegis of the 
“daguerreotype professor who, with camera-obscura and silver plate, begins now to traverse 
the land”. Though one is hard-put to pin a name or a specific enterprise on this 
“daguerreotype professor” in 1841, this reference suggests that, for Emerson, the association 
of photography to Western exploration could be a major example of such political uses. Some 
thirty years later, the photographs taken on a western survey by William Henry Jackson were 
to be cited as evidence in favor of the creation of Yellowstone National Park, and the story of 
how they “made the Park” would gain durable credence. 
 
What Emerson did not foresee was that the generalization of the use of photography in public 
policies would be brought about, more than anything, by the wreckage of the national identity 
in the Civil War. It was during the Civil War that photography first became widespread as a 
technical instrument of field documentation, mapping, and medical archiving. It was also 
during the Civil War that photography became associated with journalism and visual 
information, in this case a message of death and destruction. You all know Alexander 
Gardner’s and Timothy O’Sullivan’s widely reproduced pictures of corpses, or George 
Barnard’s views of devastated Southern cities. It was not the utopian prospect of Republican 
improvement, nor even Mathew Brady's grandiose "historical" ambition, but the collapse of 
the nation and the needs of the Union Army, that made photography, in the U.S., an 
instrument of documentation and policy, a tool for political campaigning, and a source of 
evidence in political debate. That the war precipitated photography’s cardinal position in 
public debate was shown by Oliver Wendell Holmes's comments on the ambiguous pleasures 
of stereoscopy. "The sight of these pictures, Holmes wrote about Gardner's photographs of 
Confederate dead, is a commentary on civilization such as a savage might well triumph to 
show his missionaries." "Yet, he added, through such martyrdom must come our 
                                                
11 EMERSON, Journals, vol. VIII, p. 500 
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redemption."12 The photographic exposition of the Civil War indeed inaugurated what has 
been perhaps the strongest and most constant political use of photography, i.e. the illustration 
and the denunciation of war, from Robert Capa to Don McCullin to this year’s revelations in 
Iraq. More generally, it inaugurated what Susan Sontag would recognize as "the well-known 
use of photographs in America to awaken conscience"13—that is to say, the introduction of 
their evidence into the public debate.  
 
Whether or not Emerson could foresee that the American photographic tradition would 
become essentially a political one, his parable of the Daguerreotype Institute expressed quite 
forcefully —if only in the private realm of the journals— the unique link, in the U.S., between 
photography and politics, more specifically between the art of photography and the aspiration 
to democracy. And his musings over the Republican artist who "stands aside and lets you 
paint yourself" provided a remarkable formulation of the ambivalent cultural status of 
operators in 19th century America, between an aura of magic omnipotence and a reputation for 
charlatanism and passive reception of "the sun's work". This ambivalent status, I may add, 
was not just a constraint of social discourse; it would seem, from looking at certain pictures 
by Mathew Brady himself, or Timothy O'Sullivan, that some American photographers 
actually enjoyed representing themselves as "standing aside", or visibly missing from the 
scene.  
 
3. The Kodak and the index: late 19th-century reformulations of the idea of photography. 
 
Here I am making a leap to the end of the 19th century, but keeping in mind 
O'Sullivan's stagings of his shadowy persona as "operator". It was, I think, against precisely 
this more or less willing erasure of the "operator", more generally against the whole business 
ethics of professional photography, that the so-called pictorialists, and especially the Alfred 
Stieglitz circle, waged their battle for photography as art. Of course, there were many aspects 
to this battle. But one thing that seems pretty clear is that the recognition of photography as 
high culture went along with a conceptual shift from the old "view" esthetics of the likes of 
Jackson and O'Sullivan to a new, expressionistic, definition of photography as a "medium". 
Ultimately, what the Stieglitzian photographer aimed at doing was not to represent the world 
                                                
12 O.W. HOLMES, "Doings of the Sunbeam" (The Atlantic Monthly, 1863), repr. in NEWHALL, Essays and 
Images. 
13 Susan SONTAG, On Photography, p. 63. 
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in an objective or socially acceptable fashion, but to express him- or herself in pictures, 
indeed to assert his or her individuality. As Fred Holland Day once put it about one of his 
pictures, "Behold—It is I"14. Stieglitz himself, in a famous caricature of the new symbolist 
credo of art photography, would spend ten years photographing clouds that he called 
"equivalents"— equivalents of his moods, it is usually assumed. The artist photographer of 
the 20th century was speaking in the first person—thus accomplishing a fully Emersonian self-
realization as photographer, while at the same time seemingly discarding in a definitive way 
the old "republican" idea of photography as an artless and artist-less art.  
 
Yet there is ample evidence that this old "republican" idea did not just die then and there. The 
Stieglitzian revolution was contemporary with, and in some ways contingent on, the 
popularization of photography, largely induced by George Eastman and his Kodak. In Daniel 
J. Boorstin's somewhat overly enthusiastic account of this transformation, photography went, 
with the Kodak, from a professional and "esoteric" status to that of popular pastime and 
"democratic art". The popularization of photography, in fact, was a slower and more diverse 
process than is sometimes assumed, and there was nothing intrinsically democratic about it. 
But it was nonetheless a major cultural phenomenon, which was preceded by an aspiration to 
the amateur practice of photography. George Eastman's marketing strategies, from the 
launching of the first Kodak in 1888, exploited as well as nourished this aspiration. Eastman 
never made a mystery of the fact that his goal was industrial supremacy; as he put it, "the 
manifest destiny of the Eastman Kodak Company is to be the largest manufacturer of 
photographic materials in the world or else to go to pot"15. Yet in a manner that was typical of 
the "Corporate Revolution" of the 1890s, he clothed this imperial ambition in democratic or 
rather populist language. His commercial concept, the Kodak, was presented as simple, 
friendly, untaxing for the intellect, and universal: it included the camera (a simple box with its 
film ready to be exposed and then developed by the firm's labs), the name (Kodak, which was 
supposed to be easily pronounced in every language) and the slogan ("you press the button, 
we do the rest") and its variants ("no knowledge required", etc.). In his assertive style, the 
Kodak's creator explained that he meant "to make Kodakers of every school boy and girl, and 
every wage-earning man and woman the world over" 16. The insistent appeal to children, to 
workers, and, above all, to women as the chosen bearers of the Kodak flag was especially 
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16 Quoted by William WELLING, p. 394. See also TAFT, p. 388, and JENKINS, p.112. 
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revealing of the fact that "kodakery", as it came to be called by its critics, advertised itself as a 
new power, a new freedom, a new kind of fun, if not a new republic. This populist discourse 
worked quite well; the Kodak and its slogan became a fetish of the new spirit of consumerism 
and mass entertainment. (The same populist discourse was extended to the whole 
management of Eastman's industrial empire, and made the name Kodak synonymous with a 
corporate paternalism that was supposed to palliate the deficiencies of government.)  
 
What happened with the Kodak revolution, then, was the industrial realization, and at the 
same time the commodification, of the photographic utopia that had been proclaimed in 
France in 1839 ("chacun pourra s'en servir"). Eastman's concept was very close to Daguerre's 
and Arago's, only more explicitly commercial. By an ironic twist of economic history, it was 
precisely at the time of photography's elevation to fine art status that its popularization and 
commodification gave a whole new and vastly expanded career to the idea of photography, 
now more cultural than political. Once again, as in 1839, photography was presented as the 
simplest thing in the world, and once again everyone could make pictures "as well as a trained 
artist". This was popular photography as we know it, and as Pierre Bourdieu described it in 
his 1965 book Un art moyen, a book that actually was the offshoot of a commission by 
Eastman's French subsidiary Kodak-Pathé: photography as a "median" or "average" art, 
socially defined as accessible to everyone, fun and ritual at the same time, outside of tradition 
and education. 
 
Stieglitz, of course, loathed the credo of kodakery, and reveled in biting sarcasm against 
"button-pressing". But I would argue that the prime target of his war for photography as art 
was not so much the new population of amateurs as the old cast of professionals (who were 
also, for that matter, Eastman's direct enemies). Stieglitz often used Eastman Kodak 
equipment, and in the 1900s he was not bothered by Eastman Kodak being the biggest 
advertiser in the pages of his avant-garde magazine Camera Work. It was with a hand camera, 
if not a Kodak, that he took his famous street views of New York in the 1890s and 1900s. 
These views, by the way, were far from the high symbolist style that the Photo-Secession 
would be associated with, and confirmed a taste for ordinary subjects that echoed the 
Emersonian call for a literature of "the low", and that would be admired by critics such as 
Lewis Mumford or William Carlos Williams. Many of Stieglitz's fellow artist photographers 
of the period also used Kodaks and similar equipment. In sum, the whole evolution of 
photography into a fine art, which the Modernist historiography described as a momentous 
14 
self-definition of the "medium", cannot be separated, in my view, from its broader context: 
that is, from the larger transformation of photography from a cumbersome craftsmanship of 
picture-making into a perceptive, reportorial and ritualistic activity of picture-taking. One 
crucial theme of Eastman's propaganda, that photography was a new freedom, was more than 
echoed in Stieglitz's libertarian claim that the world was there for everyone to photograph it 
according to his or her fancy. Eastman and Stieglitz jointly redefined photography as a free 
activity, if not a game, of the eye and hand, as opposed to a practice and a business involving 
the body and the machine; and thereby they both contributed to its popularization, as well as 
to its dematerialization and further idealization.  
 
There was also an intellectual side to this transformation, which is not enough acknowledged. 
It was in the period of the popularization of photography, and —I would argue— in direct 
connection with it, that photography became a philosophical object. Examples of this trend 
include, in Europe, Freud and Bergson, who both used photographic metaphors in their 
reconceptions of psychology. Clearly, in both cases, it was the new spread of photographic 
images and cameras in society that allowed, indeed that prescribed, the recourse to this 
metaphor as a pedagogical tool, as well as the critical need to denounce its limitations. The 
most profound instance of this trend occurred in the U.S., specifically in Charles Sanders 
Peirce's theory of signs. Peirce, of course, is known as the founder of modern semiotics, and 
especially as the inventor of the distinction of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols. Since 
the 1970s, as is also known, that distinction has often been used to stress the "indexical" 
nature of photographs, i.e. the fact, noted by Peirce, that photographs refer to their objects not 
just by resemblance but by a causal connection. Despite much critical opinion in favor of this 
"indexical theory of photography", I find other aspects of Peirce's thought on the matter even 
more compelling. The mere recognition of photographs as signs, and as components of 
images rather than full-fledged images or representations, was in itself quite a departure from 
common 19th-century opinion. So was Peirce's thoroughly pragmatic definition of signs in 
terms of their uses, as when he defined the icon by giving the example, "by means of two 
photographs a map can be drawn." But I mostly want to emphasize the context and the 
particular form of these observations.  
 
First, it is significant that Peirce only started to mention photographs and cameras in his 
theoretical writings in the 1890s, whereas he had been professionnally familiar with 
photography, its technology, and its semiotic complexities since the 1860s. This late date, as 
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well as the fact that he used the photograph primarily as an example for the distinction 
between icon and index, suggest that his appeal to photography was pedagogical, and 
motivated by its rapid spread in society after 1890. Second, and more significant, Peirce 
regularly formulated his observations on the semiotic nature of photographs on the basis of an 
appeal to common knowledge, as in this remarkable text from 1895: [QUOTE 4] 
 
Photographs, especially instantaneous photographs, are very instructive, because we know that 
they are in certain respects exactly like the objects they represent. But this resemblance is due 
to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically 
forced to correspond point by point to nature. In that aspect, then, they belong to the second 
class of signs, those by physical connection. The case is different if I surmise that zebras are 
likely to be obstinate, or otherwise disagreeable animals, because they seem to have a general 
resemblance to donkeys, and donkeys are self-willed. Here the donkey serves precisely as a 
probable likeness of the zebra. It is true we suppose that resemblance has a physical cause in 
heredity; but then, this hereditary affinity is itself only an inference from the likeness between 
the two animals, and we have not (as in the case of the photograph) any independent 
knowledge of the circumstances of the production of the two species. […]17 
 
Similarly, when discussing the syntax of signs in 1903, Peirce exemplified the category he 
called "Dicent Sinsign", that is of the discursive index, by a weathercock and a photograph, 
and added: "the fact that the latter is known to be the effect of the radiations renders it an 
index and highly informative".18 It is true that Peirce's recourse to what he often called 
"collateral knowledge" was a growing trend in his writings on signs after 1900 (almost to the 
point of contradicting his basic doctrine that all knowledge is created and communicated by 
signs). But, in the case of photography, it resulted in a remarkable —if incidental — 
displacement of the accepted view. Basically, to say that the reading of a photograph as a 
photograph was based not on some immanent evidence, but instead on "independent 
knowledge of its production", amounted to saying that the experience of photography was 
regulated by the idea of photography. It was like saying that the uses of photography as 
evidence (which Peirce was perhaps the first to formulate quite so forcefully) originated from 
and belonged in a kind of consensus or social contract, rather than the laws of physics; that 
the power of authentication commonly attributed to the nature of the photograph was a matter 
of "knowledge", use, practice, if not convention. This was a radical displacement indeed, the 
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philosophical strength of which has not been recognized enough. This displacement, I think, 
was made possible by the "independent knowledge" that was diffused, around 1900, by the 
popularization of photography, not just as image but as social practice. And it situated Peirce 
in a distinct American tradition of thinking on photography, represented especially by his 
fellow Bostonians Emerson and Oliver Wendell Holmes, which constantly priviledged the 
logic of social uses over the metaphysical elucidation of photography's essence. Pushing this 
connection beyond what Peirce wrote explicitly, I would argue that for him, as for Emerson, 
the idea of photography was less a function of science than the reflection of a social contract, 
by which people accepted (but could theoretically denounce) photographic representation as a 
norm of truth. 
 
4_ Closing remarks: the permanence of the political idea of photography in the 20th 
century. 
 
 I wish I had the time and means to pursue this history down to the present day. To be 
quite frank, it is a project that I am still working on, and it is a difficult task, because since the 
Kodak-Stieglitz moment, photography has become so diversified that it is difficult to identify 
a common idea behind so many trends. I do believe, however, that what I have described as 
the political idea of photography has remained relevant in the U.S. up until today. I would 
even argue that in the U.S., the whole field of (public) photographic practices —making 
photographs as well as looking, showing, commenting, and using them — has increasingly 
shaped itself as a political field. I will limit myself to a few fragmentary remarks, and hope 
that our discussion may perhaps help me fill in the holes. 
 
One fact which hardly needs stressing is that, in the 20th century, photography and 
photographers have been regularly associated with reform campaigns and often with policy 
decisions. From Lewis Hine's work with the Pittsburgh Survey and on child labor to Ansel 
Adams's official showings of his photographs to promote the conservationist ideal, American 
photographers have often been quite involved with politics and policies—more so, I think, 
than any other photographic nation. Conversely, it is only in the U.S. that photography's 
demystifying potential could become a public issue and even a burning one, as it did in the 
1950s. Then, in the face of the celebration of mankind presented at the MOMA with The 
                                                                                                                                                   
18 Collected Papers, 2.265 (1903), In BUCHLER, p. 119. 
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Family of Man, William Klein and Robert Frank caused scandal when they offered their 
devastating views of New York and Americans (both of which, of course, were published in 
France). But the most spectacular example of political photography, of course, was the 
F.S.A.'s photographic campaigns. Beyond the sheer extent of Roy Stryker's operation, what 
would need stressing here is the fact that photography became a model for the whole 
"documentary" purpose. In Walker Evans and James Agee's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, 
this purpose was remarkably close to the utopia of an art without art, perfectly transparents 
and perfectly unquestionable. As Agee put it vibrantly: [QUOTE 5] 
 
Calling for a moment everything except art Nature, I would insist that everything in Nature, 
every most casual thing, has an inevitability and perfection which art as such can only 
approach, and shares in fact, not as art, but as the part of Nature that it is; so that, for instance, 
a contour map is at least as considerably an image of absolute 'beauty' as the counterpoints of 
Bach which it happens to resemble. I would further insist that it would do human beings, 
including artists, no harm to recognize this fact, and to bear it in mind in their seining of 
experience, and to come as closely as they may be able, to recording and reproducing it for its 
own, not for art's sake. 
One reason I so deeply care for the camera is just this. So far as it goes (which is, in its 
own realm, as absolute anyhow as the traveling distance of words or sound), and handled 
cleanly and literally in its own terms, as an ice-cold, some ways limited, some ways more 
capable, eye, it is, like the phonograph record and like scientific instruments and unlike any 
other leverage of art, incapable of recording anything but absolute, dry truth.19 
 
Here, of course, the political idea was given a strong esthetic twist, photography becoming the 
matrix for a whole neo-realist, if not minimalist, style of literature. The "clean and literal" 
handling that Agee advocated, reminiscent in some ways of 19th century view-making, would 
aptly qualify Ernest Hemingway as well as Walker Evans (though perhaps not Agee 
himself…). More generally it came to characterize a whole tradition of documentary 
photography. The example provided by the F.S.A.'s photographic campaigns would not only 
influence later American undertakings (such as that of the Office of Economic Opportunity 
under JFK), but serve as a major stylistic model, in Socialist France of the 1980s, for a 
government-sponsored survey of the post-modern French landscape. For Agee, though, it was 
perfectly clear that photography was inherently political—that the usefulness of this "ice-
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cold… eye" was, as he put it in the Preface, at the service of "individual, anti-authoritative 
human consciousness" (Preface, p. x), in an attempt to vindicate "certain normal predicaments 
of human divinity". I would argue that a similar merging of esthetic and political concerns, 
the vindication of the ordinary and the self-conscious effacement of the photographer, can be 
traced through the eminently American tradition of street photography, and in later conceptual 
gestures of "de-authoring". 
 
No less significant, finally, is the fact that the precocious elevation of photography to museum 
dignity in at least some leading institutions, chiefly the MOMA, was accompanied, from the 
1930s to the 1970s and beyond, by repeated counter-efforts at foregrounding its social, 
economic and political uses. In 1938, the same year that saw the publication of the first 
version of Beaumont Newhall's History of Photography, a chemist at the University of Kansas 
named Robert Taft published his monumental Photography and the American Scene: A Social 
History 1839-1889. Taft's history was, in many ways, a reflection of his era's passion for 
making sense and making use of America's popular past. Though he refrained from directly 
contesting the Modernist narrative of photography as a medium, Taft made it clear that the 
history of American photography, at least, could not be seriously treated without taking into 
account its "effects… upon the social history of America": [QUOTE 6] 
 
No less a historian than John Richard Green has called photography the greatest boon ever 
conferred on the common man in recent times. Green cannot be far wrong. Photography 
affects the lives of modern individuals so extensively that it is difficult to enumerate all of its 
uses. In addition to preserving for us the portraits of loved ones, it illustrates our newspapers, 
our magazines, our books. […] Crime has been detected through its agency as readily as have 
flaws in metal structures. It has recorded the past, educated our youth, and last, but not least, it 
has given us the most popular form of amusement ever devised. 
 It is indeed strange that, with all these important contacts with mankind, its history in 
this country has never previously been traced, despite the fact that photography has been 
practiced in this country for nearly a century. This seems all the more remarkable when one 
reflects that photography is the most universally produced of all arts and crafts.20 
 
Appropriately, Taft's social history was bounded by 1839, the advent of the daguerreotype, 
and 1889, the advent of the Kodak, a name and a product "known in every home of the 
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civilized world" (p. 403). It highlighted, for the first time in American historical writing, 
precisely those social, economic and political functions of photography that the more 
esthetically-minded history of Beaumont Newhall tended to downplay, stressing those 
photographs that had "made history": Brady's portrait of Lincoln, Jackson's photographs of 
Yellowstone, etc. Though his concept of society and his mechanistic notion of "impact" seem 
naive today, Robert Taft thus inaugurated an important trend in historical and critical writing 
on pictures. In the 1970s, Susan Sontag, in her famous essays, gave a nostalgic deploration of 
photography's lost democratic ideals that ignored the growing art-historical scholarship on 
photography. (Here Sontag echoed Daniel Boorstin's complaint of the "dilution of experience" 
by pictures in his 1961 book The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream.) At the 
same time, the Marxist critic Alan Sekula launched a fierce attack on the museum- and 
market-governed commodification of photography, calling it a "traffic" of meaning and value.  
 
This debate, of course, is still going on in full force today, as photography has joined the 
growing field of visual culture and its ever-more refined deconstructions of the political 
meanings of representation. It is certainly striking, in this context, that Susan Sontag, in her 
most recent book on the photography of war and suffering, is still able to claim a lay point of 
view and an average, "human", ethics of looking at photographs. This would suggest that the 
old Emersonian fiction of the daguerreotype institute as a metaphor for civic virtue is not 
completely extinct. Meanwhile, the obscene pictures that keep coming from Iraq remind us 
that photography, even in the digital age, is accessible to everyone and anyone, for better or 
for worse. We may, according to an old American tradition, "indicate the indicators", and 
reform the evils that pictures make manifest. But as Charles S. Peirce knew better than 
anyone, only ourselves can be held accountable for the errors induced by our belief that 
photographs are photographs. 
 
Thank you. 
